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Measuring Revenue Responses to Tax Rate
Changes in Multi-Rate Income Tax Systems:
Behavioural and Structural Factors
John Creedy and Norman Gemmell∗
Abstract
This paper shows how income changes in response to changes in marginal
income tax rates (MTRs) translate into tax revenue changes for the familiar
multi-step income tax function used in many countries. Previous literature has
focused on the relatively straightforward case of a proportional income tax or the
top MTR only. The paper examines revenue responses at both the individual and
aggregate levels, and it is shown that for individual MTRs within a multi-rate
regime, simple expressions for tax revenue responsiveness can be derived that
nevertheless capture the various behavioural and structural responses to income
tax reforms involving changes to multiple rates and thresholds. Illustrations are
provided using changes to the New Zealand income tax structure in the 2010
Budget. This reduced all marginal tax rates while leaving income thresholds
unchanged.
Keywords: Income Tax Revenue; Elasticity of taxable income; revenue elas-
ticity.
JEL Codes: H24; H31; H26
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1 Introduction
The concept of the ‘elasticity of taxable income’, introduced by Feldstein (1995), has
become a routine part of the empirical toolkit used by economists to examine behav-
ioural responses to changes in tax rates. This elasticity is defined as the response
of taxable income to a change in the marginal net-of-tax rate (one minus the mar-
ginal rate). It is a helpful summary measure because it captures the net eﬀect on
income of all incentive eﬀects associated with the marginal rate change.1 As Feldstein
(1999) shows, under certain conditions it also plays a convenient role in measuring the
deadweight costs of marginal tax changes. However, the literature on the elasticity of
taxable income has generally ignored the associated eﬀects on income tax revenues. In
part this reflects the tendency for the analysis to be set in the context of a single rate,
proportional income tax structure where the revenue eﬀects are analytically trivial — a
given percentage change in incomes implies the same percentage change in revenues.
To the extent that revenue consequences have been explored analytically, these have
been restricted to changes in the top marginal rate aﬀecting those on high incomes;
see Saez (2004) and Saez et al. (2012).2
The aim of this paper is to show how income changes, in response to changes in
marginal income tax rates, translate into tax revenue changes for the multi-step income
tax function used in many countries. The paper examines revenue responses at both
the individual and aggregate levels, and it is shown that for individual marginal rate
changes within a multi-rate regime, it is possible to derive simple expressions for tax
revenue responsiveness that nevertheless capture the various behavioural and structural
1It avoids the considerable complexities of attempting to combine the varied behavioural adjust-
ments into a structural model, as well as providing (under certain assumptions) a convenient method
of measuring the marginal excess burden arising from tax changes. However, its use crucially de-
pends on an assumed absence of income eﬀects. The elasticity can be influenced by policy changes
concerning, for example, regulations regarding income shifting and the timing of income receipts and
tax payments. The seminal paper is Feldstein (1995), with important evidence for the US by Auten
and Carroll (1995, 1999) and Auten et al. (2008). Giertz (2007) and Saez, Slemrod and Giertz
(2009) provide comprehensive reviews of evidence, while Creedy (2010) provides an introduction to
the underlying analytics.
2Saez et al. (2012) examined changes in total tax revenue obtained from the top marginal rate in
the course of deriving the aggregate excess burden. Following Saez, the two components were also
discussed by, for example, Giertz (2009). The simple proportional income tax case is discussed by
Goolsbee (1999) and Hall (1999). Blomquist and Simula (2010) consider the welfare eﬀects of an
equal percentage point change in the marginal tax rate at all income levels, and compare results with
a linearized budget constraint.
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responses to income tax reforms involving changes to multiple rates and thresholds.
These expressions may be applied to generally available data to provide a con-
venient method for tax policy-makers to translate alternative assumptions or beliefs
regarding taxable income elasticities into revenue change forecasts. In addition, the
decomposition is useful in contexts where revenue changes form one component of a
larger economic model.3
The decomposition is shown to involve a number of elements. First, in elasticity
terms there is the obvious ceteris paribus positive revenue eﬀect of a rate rise which
depends (at the individual level) only on the tax structure: this is the partial elasticity
of revenue with respect to the relevant tax rate. Second there is a negative eﬀect arising
from behavioural responses. This latter eﬀect involves two multiplicative components:
Feldstein’s ‘elasticity of taxable income’ (ETI), and the tax revenue elasticity — the
elasticity of tax revenue with respect to a change in income — sometimes referred to as
the ‘fiscal drag’ parameter. The recognition of two basic eﬀects of a rate rise is not of
course new. Reference has long been made to ‘tax base’ and ‘tax rate’ eﬀects of rate
changes and, for example, behavioural and ‘mechanical’ eﬀects of an increase in the
top marginal tax rate were distinguished by Saez (2004).
The tax revenue elasticity is the central concept in the literature on ‘fiscal drag’
and is concerned only with the nature of the income tax structure itself and, when
considering aggregation over individuals, the form of the income distribution.4 But
the two, largely separate, literatures on fiscal drag and the elasticity of taxable income
have failed to draw out the direct connections between the two elasticity concepts.
It is shown below how the revenue elasticity has a clear role at the individual level
in influencing the change in tax revenue resulting from a marginal rate change. In
considering aggregate revenue over all individuals, changes can be expressed in terms
of the revenue elasticities at arithmetic mean income levels within each tax bracket in
a multi-rate income tax structure. These elasticities are readily calculated from tax
3Blundell (2011) argues that hours and employment responses are unlikely to be the most prevalent
reactions to top income tax rate changes; hence taxable income response estimates are potentially more
relevant. An alternative approach is to use behavioural microsimulation models that incorporate an
elasticity of taxable income; see, for example, Elmendorf et al. (2008) for an application. However,
such models are rarely available to individual researchers and the approach in this paper oﬀers a
simple analytical and practical method to decompose revenue responses to tax rate changes.
4See the survey in Creedy and Gemmell (2002). The revenue elasticity is also used in discussions
of local measures of tax progressivity.
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schedule and taxpayer income data. It is also shown that the restriction of previous
analyses to the top marginal rate involves a substantial simplification. The present
paper extends the treatment to deal with changes resulting from any tax rate, and
thereby also deals with simultaneous changes in all tax rates. At the aggregate level,
unlike the Saez et al. (2012) top rate case, no specific income distribution assumption
is required.5
Section 2 explores the precise relationships among the various elasticities, extending
the analysis of a single rate tax function to the ubiquitous multi-step tax case. Section
3 looks at aggregation over individuals when a single marginal rate changes within a
multi-rate tax structure. The analysis focuses on the eﬀects on income tax revenue,
and it is worth recognising that, to the extent that the elasticity of taxable income
captures some shifting towards sources which attract lower marginal rates, there are
additional consequences for tax revenue. However, as is shown below following Saez et
al. (2012), income-switching eﬀects can be included with a suitable redefinition of the
marginal tax rate.
To illustrate the orders of magnitude involved, section 4 applies the aggregate analy-
sis to the New Zealand income tax system. This provides a convenient example since
the New Zealand government’s 2010 Budget involved changes to all marginal income
tax rates whilst holding all thresholds constant. Brief conclusions are in Section 5.
2 Relationships Among Elasticities
This section demonstrates, at the individual level, how the revenue elasticity and the
elasticity of taxable income combine to generate the elasticity of tax with respect to
the marginal rate. For convenience, the distinction between gross income and taxable
income is ignored, though this distinction is likely to be important for countries with
extensive income tax deductions.6 If there are endogenous, income-related deductions,
5Following Feldstein (1999), Saez et al. (2012), Brewer et al. (2010) and Blundell (2011) also use
the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) concept to derive and discuss simple analytical results, in terms
of the ETI, for the deadweight losses associated with top marginal tax rates. Creedy (2010) provides
a comparable analysis for the multi-step income tax considered here.
6For discussion of the empirical importance of income-related deductions in personal income tax
regimes in OECD countries, see Caminada and Goudswaard (1996) and Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer
(2001). For the US, Feldstein (1999, p. 675) estimated that total income tax deductions in 1993
amounted to about 60 per cent of estimated taxable income.
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the following analysis must be in terms of income after deductions have been made.
The literature on the tax revenue elasticity concentrates on the eﬀects of changes
in taxation resulting from exogenous changes in taxable income, with tax rates and
thresholds held constant.7 Furthermore, it is usual to assume that the exogenous
change in income does not cause the individual to move into a higher tax bracket. Such
a movement, where the tax function involves discrete changes in marginal rates, gives
rise to a large jump in the elasticity, and this can — when carrying out appropriately
tax-share weighted aggregation — distort aggregate elasticity values. To help clarify
the main features, subsection 2.1 concentrates on the simple case of a single marginal
rate applied to income measured in excess of a tax-free threshold. The extension to a
multi-rate function is in subsection 2.2. The eﬀect of income shifting to an alternative
source facing a lower tax rate is examined in subsection 2.3.
2.1 A Single Rate Above a Tax-free Threshold
Let the tax paid by an individual with income of    be denoted  () =  ( − ),
and  () = 0 for  6 . The individual revenue elasticity, , is defined as:
 = 

 (1)
and is given by the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate faced by
the individual. The following uses the general notation,  =   , to denote a ‘total’
elasticity, and 0 =   , to denote a partial elasticity. The revenue elasticity thus has
the property that  = 0. For this structure:
 =  −  (2)
and the individual elasticity must exceed unity so long as   0.
Consider a change in the individual’s tax liability resulting from an exogenous
increase in  , with the threshold, , unchanged. From the total diﬀerential,  =

  +  , dividing by  and writing in elasticity form gives:
 = 0 +  (3)
7The restriction to exogenous income changes is easily handled when considering individual elas-
ticity values, but of course the nature of the overall distribution of income, which is needed to obtain
aggregate values, may well be influenced by the incentive eﬀects of the consequent tax changes.
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The first term may be said to reflect a pure ‘tax rate’ eﬀect of a rate change, with
unchanged incomes, while the second term reflects the combined ‘tax base’ eﬀect,
resulting from the incentive eﬀects on taxable income, and the revenue consequences
of that income change. The first term is given by:
0 =  ( − ) () = 1 (4)
Hence, for a single rate tax, the ‘tax rate’ eﬀect in (3) equals one for all taxpayers
where   . When discussing the eﬀect on total revenue of a change in the top income
tax rate, Saez et al. (2009) refer to the tax rate eﬀect as ‘mechanical’ and the second
term as the ‘behavioural’ eﬀect respectively. Thus, their ‘behavioural eﬀect’ combines
the revenue elasticity and elasticity of taxable income eﬀects.8
,T y
,y t
Revenue increases
Figure 1: Revenue-Increasing Elasticity Combinations
From (3), tax paid by the individual increases, when the marginal rate increases,
only if: ¡¢ ¯¯ ¯¯  0 (5)
The condition in equation (5) can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 1, where the
terms on the left-hand side,  and
¯¯ ¯¯, are respectively on the horizontal and
8Saez et al. (2009, p. 5) do not discuss the separate role of the revenue elasticity in this context.
Discussion of the rate and base eﬀects is often discussed in the context of a simple proportional tax
structure, with constant average and marginal rate, , where the revenue elasticity is everywhere unity.
Thus if ¯ is arithmetic mean income,  = ¯ + ¯ and in terms of elasticities,  = 1 + ¯.
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vertical axes.9 This shows that, for the individual’s tax liability to increase when
 increases, the combination of (absolute) elasticities must lie to the south west of a
rectangular hyperbola shown in the Figure. The position of the hyperbola is determined
by the ‘mechanical’ elasticity, 0 , which in this case is 1.
Equation (3) contains  , while the Feldstein elasticity of taxable income, 1− ,
measures behavioural responses with respect to a change in a marginal net-of-tax rate,
1 −  , facing the individual. However, the two elasticities are related by 1− =
− ¡1− ¢  . Hence the elasticity of revenue with respect to the marginal rate faced
by an individual can be obtained by substituting (2) and (4) in (3) to get:
 = 1−
µ 
 − 
¶µ 
1− 
¶
1− (6)
The term after the minus sign captures the behavioural response and combines the
reduction in the tax base (via the individual elasticity of taxable income) with the
structural eﬀect (via the individual revenue elasticity). The next subsection shows that
similar elasticity expressions can be obtained for any multi-step income tax function.
2.2 The Multi-rate Tax Function
The multi-step tax function is described by a set of income thresholds,    , and
a corresponding set of marginal tax rates   . It can be written as:10
 () =  1 ( − 1) 1   ≤ 2
=  1 (2 − 1) +  2 ( − 2) 2   ≤ 3 (7)
and so on. If  falls into the th tax bracket, so that    ≤ +1  () can be
expressed for  ≥ 2 as:
 () =  ( − ) +
−1X
=1
  (+1 − ) (8)
9The constant revenue line in Figure 1 is similar to that obtained by Fullerton (1982, p. 9),
concentrating on labour supply responses to tax increases. Fullerton drew a downward sloping convex
curve with the labour supply elasticity on the vertical axis and the tax rate on the horizontal axis.
For tax revenue to increase when the tax rate increases, the supply elasticity must be suﬃciently
small; that is, the combination of tax rate and elasticity must lie to the south west of his curve. In
simulations, Fullerton (1982, p. 13) held the revenue elasticity, , constant as the tax rate was
varied (by increasing average and marginal rates by the same percentage).
10The revenue elasticity properties of this function are examined in more detail in Creedy and
Gemmell (2002).
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Hence:
 () =  ( − ∗) (9)
where ∗ is given by:
∗ = 1
X
=1
 (  −  −1) (10)
and  0 = 0. Thus the tax function facing any individual taxpayer in the th bracket
is equivalent to a tax function with a single marginal tax rate,  applied to income
measured in excess of a single ‘eﬀective’ threshold, ∗. Unlike , ∗ diﬀers across
individuals depending on the marginal income tax bracket into which they fall. Hence
the results obtained in the previous subsection can easily be adapted for the multi-rate
system. For example, the revenue elasticity for those in the th bracket is:
 =  − ∗ (11)
Within each tax bracket the elasticity declines as income increases. As an individual
crosses an income threshold, the revenue elasticity takes a discrete upward jump, before
gradually declining again. The resulting saw-tooth pattern is illustrated in Figure 2,
which is based on the New Zealand income tax system with four (non-zero) marginal
tax rates and thresholds, examined further in section 4.
The mechanical eﬀect — the partial individual elasticity, 0— is readily obtained
from (8) and is given by:11
0 =
 ( − )
 () =
 ()
 () (12)
where  () is the tax paid at the rate, , and  () is total tax paid by the individual.
Hence, for the multi-rate case, (6) becomes:
 =
 ()
 () −
µ 
 − ∗
¶µ 
1− 
¶
1− (13)
for a change in the th marginal rate. Unlike the single rate case, the mechanical eﬀect
associated with changes in each  in (13), 0 , is less than 1, and can be measured
by the individual’s tax revenue share,  ()  ().
11The partial individual elasticity, 0 , for    (that is, for changes in marginal tax rates below
the tax bracket in which the individual falls) is also obtained as 0 = (+1−) () = () () , where () is tax paid at the rate,   , and  () is total tax paid by the individual. Across all tax bracketsP
=1 0 = 1.
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Figure 2: The Income Tax Revenue Elasticity
2.3 Allowing for Income Shifting
The behavioural responses captured in equation (13) assume that taxable income re-
ductions in response to an increase in  are untaxed. However, income shifted to avoid
income tax is likely to be taxed at a lower rate via alternative taxes such as corporate
income tax (for example, when individuals incorporate) or indirect taxation, when the
avoided income tax is spent. Saez et al. (2009) address this for the case of the top
income tax rate, where a fraction of taxable income,   1, is shifted out of the income
tax regime in response to a top marginal rate rise, and is taxed at the lower rate, .
In the present context, suppose that, for a given marginal tax rate, , a fraction
1−  of an individual’s tax-liable income,  − ∗, is declared for tax under the income
tax, while a fraction  is shifted but is taxed at an average tax rate  ≥ 0 under an
alternative tax. Equation (9) can thus be rewritten as:
 () = (1− ) ( − ∗) +  ( − ∗)
= [ − ( − )] ( − ∗)
=  ∗ ( − ∗) (14)
where  () is now total revenue raised via both taxes and  ∗ = [ − ( − )].
Substituting  ∗ for  in (9), it follows that the revenue elasticity in (11) is unaﬀected
9
except that ∗ in (10) is now defined in terms of  ∗ rather than . The revenue
elasticity remains equal to  ( − ∗) because the marginal tax rate terms in both the
numerator and denominator cancel. The combined revenue eﬀect of a change in the
tax rate,  ∗, is thus obtained from (13), simply by replacing  with  ∗.12
3 Aggregate Revenue
For tax policy purposes attention is often devoted to aggregate revenue and its variation
as component tax rates are changed. This section therefore examines aggregation over
individuals. The key aspect of interest is the eﬀect on total income tax revenue of a
change in a single tax rate, and the eﬀect of a simultaneous similar change in all rates.
As above, attention is focussed on the case of the multi-rate tax function.13 First,
components of total revenue are examined in subsection 3.1. Aggregate elasticities are
then derived in subsection 3.2.
3.1 Components of Total Revenue
In the multi-rate form, if  is in the th tax bracket a distinction can be made between
the total tax paid by the individual and the tax paid at the marginal rate, , only,
thereby ignoring tax paid on income falling within lower thresholds. Let  represent
aggregate revenue over all individuals, while refers to the aggregate revenue obtained
from all individuals whose incomes fall in the th tax bracket. Hence,  is the
aggregate over individuals in the th bracket of  ( − ∗) values. Let () denote
the aggregate amount raised only at the rate  from individuals who fall into the
th bracket. Thus () is the sum over individuals in the th bracket of  ( − )
values. Furthermore, +() refers to the aggregate revenue obtained at the th rate from
individuals whose incomes fall into higher tax brackets. Hence, +() is the number of
all individuals in higher tax brackets multiplied by  (+1 − ).
Formally, in the multi-step tax function with  brackets, suppose  people are in
each bracket, for  = 1  , and the arithmetic mean income in each bracket is ¯,
12This analysis assume that both  and  do not change in response to changes in .
13It is assumed that all individuals face the same income thresholds, so that endogenous allowances
are not considered here.
10
then:
 =  (¯ − ∗) (15)
() =  (¯ − ) (16)
+() = + (+1 − ) (17)
where + ≡
P
=+1  denotes the number of people above the th tax bracket. For
the top marginal rate, where  = , clearly + = 0.
The components of aggregate revenue,
P
=1, are represented in tabular form
in Table 1, where  = 1  4 is used for illustration. The term () in the second
column shows revenue raised from taxpayers in each tax bracket at their marginal
rates; columns 3-5 show revenue raised intramarginally at each lower rate, +(). Total
revenue raised at each marginal rate, , is also shown in each row and can also
be expressed in terms of the eﬀective thresholds, ∗; with total revenue raised at all
marginal rates given by:  =P4=1 =P4=1  (¯ − ∗).
Table 1: The Decomposition of Aggregate Revenue
 () +(1) +(2) +(3)
1 =  1 (¯1 − 1)1 0 0 0
2 =  2 (¯2 − 2)2 +  1 (2 − 1)2 0 0
3 =  3 (¯3 − 3)3 +  1 (2 − 1)3 +  2 (3 − 2)3 0
4 =  4 (¯4 − 4)4 +  1 (2 − 1)4 +  2 (3 − 2)4 +  3 (4 − 3)4
Within each th bracket,  6= () + +(). This is because  includes revenue
raised from th bracket taxpayers including on their income taxed at lower tax rates.
For example, from row 3, column 2 of the table, (2) =  2 (¯2 − 2)2 while, from
column 4, +(2) =  2 (3 − 2)
P4
=3 . However, from row 3:
2 =  2 (¯2 − 2)2 +  1 (2 − 1)2 (18)
That is, 2 involves the term  1 (2 − 1) for 2 individuals, not included in (2) or
+(2). As shown in (15), 2 can be expressed more simply in terms of the eﬀective
threshold, ∗2, which captures all marginal and intramarginal eﬀects on 2.
The aggregate revenue decomposition is illustrated in Figure 3. This shows, on
the horizontal axis, the percentage of total taxpayers,  , ranked by income. The
vertical axis shows the amount of total tax revenue paid by each taxpayer (truncated
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Figure 3: Aggregate Revenue Decomposition
at $20,000 for ease of illustration). As in Figure 2, this is illustrated for the New
Zealand income tax system with four non-zero marginal tax rates and thresholds. A
population of 5000 individuals has been simulated whose incomes are assumed to follow
a lognormal distribution, with mean and variance of logs of 10 and 07 respectively,
yielding an arithmetic mean income of approximately $31,000 and a mean tax payment
of approximately $5300.
The resulting relationship between the numbers of taxpayers and total tax paid is
given by the line  in Figure 3. The shape of the line reflects the combined eﬀects
of the moments of the taxable income distribution and the structure of the income tax
function. The area under the curve  indicates, for any subset of taxpayers, , total
tax revenue from those  taxpayers,  =   (¯ − ∗ ). The figure shows revenue for
the four tax brackets and subsets of taxpayers, 1 to 4.
The four brackets,  = 1  4, account for approximately 30, 52, 10 and 8 per
cent of taxpayers respectively. Revenue contributed by taxpayers in the lowest tax
brackets, at marginal rate  1, is shown by the shaded segment (1), while the blue
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shaded rectangle +(1) measures revenue raised at rate  1 from higher marginal rate
( 2  3  4) taxpayers. Similarly for higher tax brackets,  = 2  4, the respective ()
and +() areas under the curve are shown in Figure 3, with +(4) = 0. Hence summing
the revenue ‘blocks’ for each tax rate in Figure 3 horizontally represents () + +(),
while summing the revenue ‘blocks’ for each tax bracket vertically represents .
As stressed above, although  6= () + +(), summing across all  = 1  
tax brackets (the sum of all shaded areas in Figure 3), it is nevertheless true that
 =P=1 =P=1()+P=1+(), (with +() = 0). Thus aggregate revenue can
be written as:
 =
X
=1
 (¯ − ∗)
=
X
=1
 (¯ − ) +
−1X
=1
 (+1 − )+ (19)
=
X
=1
³
() ++()
´
(20)
The expression in (19) provides the basis, in the next subsection, for an examination
of changes in aggregate revenue in response to changes in individual marginal tax rates.
3.2 Changes in Aggregate Revenue
Consider a change in the th marginal tax rate. The change in aggregate revenue can
be obtained by diﬀerentiation of (19) and expressed in elasticity form:  . Assume
first that there are no behavioural responses, and letting  ≡   :
 =
() ++()
 (21)
That is, the responsiveness of aggregate revenue to a change in any tax rate, , is
obtained simply as the ratio of revenue raised at rate  (from all taxpayers in the th
tax bracket and above) to total revenue. For this ‘no behavioural response’ case, these
elasticities sum to unity across all  = 1  , so that the elasticity of total revenue
with respect to an equal proportional change in all rates is unity. Any behavioural
response clearly reduces the elasticity below 1, as shown below.
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In the case where there are behavioural eﬀects of marginal rate changes, it is conve-
nient to assume that all those in a given bracket have the same behavioural elasticity;
that is  = ¯ . In this case, ¯ in (19) can be suitably adjusted to ¯
¡
1 + 
¢
and (21) becomes:
 =
() ++()
 +
¯
 (22)
where the additional term, ¯, captures the behavioural eﬀect in revenue
terms. This can be simplified, and expressed in terms of the Feldstein elasticity by not-
ing from (15) that  =  (¯ − ∗), and using  = −
³

1−
´
1− . Equation
(22) then becomes:
 =
() ++()
 −


µ ¯
¯ − ∗
¶µ 
1− 
¶
1− (23)
Equation (23) allows the separate components influencing  to be identified in a
more transparent way. Firstly, the mechanical eﬀect is given by
³
() ++()
´
, while
the behavioural eﬀect is captured by the terms after the minus sign. This is composed
of the Feldstein elasticity of taxable income of those in the th tax bracket, 1− ,
the revenue elasticity at ¯, equal to ¯ (¯ − ∗), and the tax rate term (1− ).
The revenue share term, , translates these eﬀects into a total revenue response,
as distinct from total revenue from th bracket taxpayers, .
Equation (23) can alternatively be expressed in terms of actual thresholds, ,
rather than eﬀective thresholds, ∗, by noting that  = ()
()
 and, from (15) and
(16), that (()) = (¯ − ∗)  (¯ − ). Substitution into (23) then yields:
 =
+()
 +
()

∙
1−
µ ¯
¯ − 
¶µ 
1− 
¶
1−
¸
(24)
The decomposition in (24) is useful in subsection 3.4 when comparing with previ-
ous results for the top tax rate where eﬀective thresholds have not been considered.
Though  in (23) and (24) look cumbersome, they can generally be calculated from
information that is readily available for most income tax systems; namely the com-
monly estimated ‘fiscal drag’ elasticity, ¯ (¯ − ∗), the Feldstein elasticity, 1− ,
and various revenue ratios associated with total revenue decompositions by tax bracket
or tax rate.
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3.3 Revenue-Reducing Tax Rate Increases
The question of when a tax rate increase might reduce, rather than increase, revenue is
a frequent concern of tax policy reformers. Using the previous analysis, the aggregate
revenue maximum (the top of the ‘Laﬀer curve’) can also be obtained from equation
(23) by setting  = 0, to give:
1− =
Ã() ++()

!µ
1− 

¶µ ¯ − ∗
¯
¶
(25)
For the top bracket only (the focus of previous literature), where +() = 0, the
relevant condition is  = 0, and (25) becomes:
1− =
()

µ
1− 

¶µ ¯ − ∗
¯
¶
(26)
Hence, an actual elasticity of taxable income greater than that given in (25) or
(26) implies a revenue-reducing response to marginal tax rate changes. Considering
the right-hand-side of (26), although
³
1−
´
exceeds 1 as long as the tax rate,  , is
less than 0.5, the ratio of revenue shares ()  1, and the inverse of the revenue
elasticity
³ ¯−∗¯ ´  1. Hence the critical revenue-maximising value of 1− could
be well below 1 in some cases, such that the required elasticity of taxable income for a
tax rate increase to generate an increase aggregate revenue can also be relatively low.
Section 4 provides some illustrative orders of magnitude.
3.4 Comparisons with Earlier Results
The above results for any tax rate in a multi-rate structure may be compared with that
given by Saez et al. (2012, equation 4) specifically for the top marginal rate,  . They
consider changes in aggregate income tax paid at the top rate only and their result
refers to the elasticity of income tax paid at the rate , which may be defined here as
() . When converted to the present notation and written in elasticity form, Saez
et al. (2012, equation 4) can be written as:
() =
∙
1−
µ ¯
¯ − 
¶µ 
1− 
¶
1−
¸
(27)
This can be seen to be the top rate equivalent of equation (24) above where in this
case, +() = 0, and where the ‘total’ revenue in question is now () rather than .
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Hence comparing equations (24) and (27) it can be seen that the Seaz et al. version
gives the same revenue responsiveness for the top tax rate as the approach above, in
terms of the percentage change in revenue from the top tax rate only - captured by the
terms in square brackets. Of course this exceeds a measure of the percentage change
in total income tax revenue (from all tax rates) when the top rate changes, as shown
by the full expression in (24) and where  = . That is:
 =
()

∙
1−
µ ¯
¯ − 
¶µ 
1− 
¶
1−
¸
(28)
where ()  1, and +() does not appear in (28) since +() = 0.
Saez et al. (2012) discuss the term ¯ (¯ − ), which is constant if the income
distribution above the top threshold follows the Pareto form.14 The Saez et al. ex-
pression therefore does not highlight the role for the revenue elasticity at ¯ , given
by ¯ (¯ − ∗), but which is captured in general form in (23) and is a commonly
measured property of income tax systems. Furthermore, their ‘behavioural response’
combines both the behavioural income response and the revenue elasticity eﬀect, where
the latter depends on the full tax structure, not just the top rate and threshold, as well
as average income above the top threshold. Hence, the Saez et al. elasticity result is a
special case of the more general result derived in (23) above.
The policy significance of the results derived above is that a given behavioural
response to a change in a marginal tax rate could have quite diﬀerent impacts on tax
revenue depending on the nature of the tax structure and the distribution of taxable
income across all taxpayers. This complete taxable income distribution is unlikely to
be adequately described by the Pareto form. The next section provides some orders of
magnitude for these eﬀects, based on data for New Zealand.
4 Illustrative Examples
To provide an illustration of the nature of the relationships involved and the sensitivity
to variations in the elasticity of taxable income, this section considers changes to the
New Zealand income tax structure, made in the 2010 Budget. Conveniently for present
purposes, this reduced all income tax rates but left income thresholds unchanged.
14For the US, Saez et al. (2012) find values for
³ ¯−¯ ´ around 1.5; that is, ³ ¯¯− ´ ' 067.
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Table 2 provides summary information regarding the distribution of annual personal
taxable incomes in the 2008/09 tax year, the most recent available year.15 The overall
arithmetic mean taxable income is $35,507. The thresholds shown in the table also
relate to the structure in 2009/10.
Table 2: The Distribution of Taxable Income in New Zealand: 2008/09 Tax Year
  ¯ Prop of people Prop of income
1 1 6748.82 0.241 0.046
2 14000 24080.76 0.434 0.294
3 48000 52414.34 0.224 0.331
4 70000 115480.70 0.101 0.329
Table 3 provides summary information about the pre- and post-2010 Budget tax
structures, for the taxable income distribution of Table 2. The Budget 2010 reductions
in all tax rates, and especially the top rate, are shown in Table 3. Given the relatively
low value of the income threshold above which the top rate applies ($70,000). Table 3
shows that this tax bracket contributes a higher proportion of total income tax revenue
than the other brackets, even though it contains only ten per cent of taxpayers (Table
2). This compares with the second tax bracket which contains over forty per cent of
all taxpayers. The final column of Table 3 reports the revenue elasticity, , in each
tax bracket, evaluated at arithmetic mean income within the bracket. For each tax
structure, this elasticity is highest in the third tax bracket because the value of ¯3
is relatively closer to the eﬀective income threshold, ∗3 than for the other brackets.
For those in the first tax bracket, the average and marginal tax rates are equal (New
Zealand has no initial tax-free threshold) and hence the revenue elasticity is unity.
The Budget changes in the marginal tax rates can be seen to have little eﬀect on the
revenue elasticities.
Figures 4 and 5 show the variations in the elasticity of revenue with respect to
,  , for each tax bracket, as the elasticity of taxable income, 1− , increases.
The lines marked ‘all MTRs’ in these figures show the elasticity of total revenue with
respect to a simultaneous equal proportionate change in all marginal tax rates. These
must begin at  = 1 when the elasticity of taxable income is zero at all income
15The table is obtained from unpublished Inland Revenue Department data covering 3,304,210
individuals.
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Table 3: The New Zealand Income Tax Structure Before and After the 2010 Budget
  ∗    (¯)
Tax rates pre-2010 Budget
1 0.125 1.00 843.48 0.027 1.000
2 0.210 5667.26 3866.83 0.222 1.308
3 0.330 21060.99 10346.61 0.306 1.672
4 0.380 27500.33 33432.53 0.446 1.313
Tax rates post-2010 Budget
1 0.105 1.00 708.52 0.026 1.000
2 0.175 5600.60 3234.03 0.217 1.303
3 0.300 23267.02 8744.20 0.303 1.798
4 0.330 27515.47 29028.52 0.454 1.313
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0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
Elasticity of total 
revenue w.r.t. MTR
Elasticity of taxable income
All  MTRs
MTR = 0.125
MTR = 0.21
MTR = 0.33
MTR = 0.38
Figure 4: Elasticity of Total Tax Revenue wrt Tax Rates: Pre-2010 Budget
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Figure 5: Elasticity of Total Tax Revenue wrt Tax Rates: Post-2010 Budget
levels. The other lines in the figures indicate, for each tax bracket, the variation in
the elasticity,  , when only the th marginal tax rate is increased, with other rates
held constant.
As demonstrated by equation (23) above, the value of each  falls linearly with
1− , but the rate of decrease is less in the post-2010 Budget structure. This reflects
the impact of the Budget on terms in equation (23) involving  and ∗, as well as
eﬀects on the revenue share terms. In each case the elasticity,  , for the lowest
income tax bracket remains approximately constant across diﬀerent ETI values. The
change in this marginal rate has an income eﬀect on those in higher tax brackets,
but this, by assumption, does not aﬀect their taxable income; hence increasing the
elasticity of taxable income has a smaller eﬀect on the total revenue elasticity than for
other tax brackets. The revenue elasticity is highest in the third tax bracket; see Table
3. Nevertheless, the value of  falls slightly faster in the top marginal rate bracket.
This is because the value of  (1− ) is higher for the top marginal tax rate, along
with the fact that the top-rate bracket contributes a higher proportion of aggregate tax
revenue; see Table 3. The reduction in the two highest marginal tax rates in the 2010
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Budget implies that the elasticity,  , continues to be positive, for higher values of
the elasticity of taxable income than the equivalent pre-2010 cases.
These diagrams show the eﬀect on aggregate revenue for alternative assumed values
of the elasticity of taxable income in each tax brackets. The appropriate empirical
value of the ETI is, however, likely to vary across tax brackets. Some evidence for
New Zealand taxpayers is reported in Claus et al. (2010), who found that for those
in the lower tax brackets, the estimated elasticities were very small, while for the top
marginal tax rate the responses were substantial, with values mainly in the range 0.5
to 1.2.
These findings have potentially important implications. For the higher marginal tax
rates, the diagrams show that if the elasticity is above around 0.6, further increases
in the rates could lead to reductions in total income tax revenue. Aggregate revenue
is clearly most responsive to changes in the second marginal rate even if, as seems
unlikely, the elasticity of taxable income is relatively high. Diagrams such as Figures 4
and 5 therefore provide a convenient way to identify the revenue eﬀects of changes to
diﬀerent marginal tax rates for alternative assumptions regarding the taxable income
responses of taxpayers in diﬀerent tax brackets.
5 Conclusions
This paper has examined the joint role of the elasticity of taxable income (which
refers to the behavioural eﬀect on taxable income of a marginal tax rate change) and
the revenue elasticity (which reflects the structural eﬀect on revenue of a change in
taxable income) in influencing the revenue eﬀects of tax rate changes. Traditionally,
the revenue elasticity has been the central concept when examining fiscal drag, and
obtaining local measures of tax progressivity. But it has an additional role in the
context of the revenue eﬀects of tax changes when incomes respond to rate changes.
Though ‘mechanical’ and behavioural eﬀects have been distinguished in the literature,
this separate revenue eﬀect has not previously been discussed explicitly within the
context of typical multi-rate income tax regimes.
The paper has examined the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to a rate change,
in such multi-rate systems, at both the individual and aggregate levels and shown that
tractable expressions can be derived for the revenue consequences of various marginal
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tax rate changes with associated income responses. When a single marginal tax rate in
a multi-rate income tax structure is changed, those in the relevant tax bracket adjust
their incomes in accordance with the elasticity of taxable income, and this aﬀects the
tax paid via the revenue elasticity. There is also a revenue eﬀect on those individuals
who are in higher tax brackets, since marginal rate changes in lower tax brackets imply
a change in their eﬀective income threshold. But there are no marginal incentive eﬀects
on higher-rate taxpayers because only their average tax rate changes. Only if there
were no incentive eﬀects would an equal proportional change in all marginal tax rates
produce the same proportional increase in total revenue.
Illustrations were provided using the New Zealand income tax structures before
and after the 2010 Budget. This reduced all marginal rates while leaving income
thresholds unchanged and, in particular, reduced the top marginal rate substantially.
The elasticity of total tax revenue with respect to a single tax rate change was found to
be particularly sensitive to the elasticity of taxable income in the top two tax brackets.
In the pre-Budget structure, an elasticity of taxable income in excess of about 0.6 was
found to produce a negative tax revenue response to an increase in the top two marginal
rates. When these rates are lower, as in the post-Budget structure, the elasticity of
taxable income needs to be over 0.8 before tax revenue in the highest tax bracket
is expected to fall in response to an increase in the marginal rate. However, recent
estimates of the elasticity of taxable income in the top tax bracket in New Zealand are
in the range (with some estimates in excess of 1) where tax revenue may fall.
These results for New Zealand illustrate how detailed empirical investigation of
the elasticity of taxable income for taxpayers in diﬀerent income tax brackets can be
important to assess whether cuts in some marginal tax rates are likely to be revenue-
enhancing.
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